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Abstract Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) was a UK government cash
transfer paid directly to children aged 16–18, in the first 2 years of post-compulsory
full-time education. This paper uses the labour supply effect of EMA to infer the
magnitude of the transfer response made by the parent, and so test for the presence of
an ‘effectively altruistic’ head-of-household, who redistributes resources among
household members so as to maximise overall welfare. Using data from the Longi-
tudinal Study of Young People in England, an EMA payment of £30 per week is found
to reduce teenagers’ labour supply by 3 h per week and probability of employment by
13 % points from a base of 43 %. We conclude that parents withdraw cash and in-kind
transfers from their children to a value of between 22 and 86 % of what the child
receives in EMA. This means we reject the hypothesis of an effectively altruistic
head-of-household, and argue that making this cash transfer directly to the child
produces higher child welfare than if the equivalent transfer were made to parents.
Keywords Education Maintenance Allowance  Altruism  Transfers  Rotten kid
JEL Classification I38  J22  H53
1 Introduction
Publicly provided transfers targeted at children are usually made in-kind or as a
hypothecated cash transfer paid to parents. There are two mechanisms which may
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mitigate the benefit from these transfers to the intended recipient. Firstly, if the
transfer is paid to the parent, there is an agency problem: The parent is not
compelled to spend the benefit on the child. For example, Blow et al. (2012) find
that unanticipated variation in the level of Child Benefit in the UK affects
expenditure predominantly on adult-assignable goods, while Kooreman (2000) finds
strong positive effects of the Dutch Child Benefit on child-assignable goods. (The
‘labelling effect’ of the programme’s name clearly differs between these
countries—see Beatty et al. 2014). It also matters which parent receives the welfare
payment, with a switch from father to mother (‘wallet to purse’) being shown to
raise expenditure on child care and children’s clothing, and reduce expenditure on
alcohol and tobacco, for example (Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998).
Secondly, regardless of who receives the transfer, parental altruism may substan-
tially offset the gain to the targeted household member, as an altruistic head-of-
household may redistribute resources among household members so as to maximise
household welfare (Becker 1974, 1981). In this case, an in-kind transfer may still
benefit the child if the household is induced to consume more of the good than it
would voluntarily (Currie and Gahvari 2008), or if the parent does not perceive the
publicly provided good to be a close substitute for a privately provided good. For
example, Bingley and Walker (2013), show that day care milk or milk tokens in the
UK crowd out private expenditure on milk (an essentially homogeneous product) to
80 % of these transfers’ value, but Free School Meals (for which there is no close
market substitute) only crowd out expenditure on food to 15 % of their value.
Nevertheless, von Hinke Kessler Scholder (2013) finds no effect of the withdrawal
of Free School Meals from some groups on their bodyweight, suggesting that
targeted children receive no better an overall diet than in the absence of the
programme.
The extent to which the incidence of the net benefit of a transfer programme is
retained by the targeted recipient is referred to as the ‘Intrahousehold Flypaper
Effect’ (Jacoby 2002). In this paper we evaluate the magnitude of this effect for the
UK’s Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) programme. EMA was a means-
tested cash transfer of up to £30 per week paid by the UK government to students
undertaking the first 2 years of full time post-compulsory education (aged 16 or 17
on 31st August at the start of the school year). Eligibility was determined by
household income, according to the thresholds shown in Table 1.1 At its peak in the
2009–2010 school year the scheme cost £580 m and served 643,000 recipients (see
Bolton 2011, p. 2).
EMA differs from most high profile conditional cash transfers (CCTs), such as
Bolsa Famı´lia in Brazil, Opportunidades in Mexico, and Opportunity NYC in the
United States, in two ways. Firstly, it is a late intervention, targeting the continued
human capital development of ‘children’ (in fact young adults) beyond the
compulsory schooling age, rather than school attendance or health programme
1 Income earned by the child through part-time work or their own welfare receipt was disregarded. These
thresholds and entitlements were unchanged in nominal terms over the scheme’s life in England,
2004–2011.
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participation among primary-age children. Secondly, it is paid straight to the child,
rather than to the mother.
Paying CCTs to the mother requires her agency, to pass the (benefits of the)
transfer to the intended recipient, on behalf of the state. Because EMA was paid
directly to the child, there is no agency problem. This and several other contextual
features make EMA ideal to investigate the extent of crowd-out of private transfers
by this public transfer, and to attribute this effect to the mechanism of parental
altruism. EMA was paid in cash, which is a perfect substitute for cash transfers from
parents, and for the parents’ own income. Moreover, barriers to participation were
low (students needed a bank account in their name and a parental declaration of
income once each academic year) and stigma unlikely to be a problem (the
eligibility criteria were wide and take-up high—in our data 86 % of those
apparently eligible for the highest payment, and 45 % of all students, receive EMA),
so conditional on participation in full-time education the direct non-pecuniary costs
associated with receipt of the benefit should be negligible. The intervention was also
of a substantial economic magnitude, both for the child and the household. For
example, the highest weekly EMA payment of £30 per week during term times was
larger than the mean weekly earnings of teenagers in employment during their final
year of compulsory schooling in the LSYPE (£27.76), and corresponds to a tax free
increase in the household’s full income of up to £1170 per year, or a minimum of
5.6 % of parent’s income for those in the lowest income eligibility bracket.
Altogether, this means that the parent’s transfer response to EMA should provide a
clean test of whether the parent’s behaviour is consistent with that of an effectively
altruistic head-of-household.
The extent to which the public transfers are crowded out by family transfers is
usually evaluated using data on household expenditure patterns for ‘child-assignable
goods’ (Kooreman 2000; Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004; Attanasio and Mesnard
2006; Blow et al. 2012). A challenge to the identification of this degree of crowd-out
is lack of (or measurement error in) data on (the value of) shared services or in-kind
transfers within private households. For this reason, one approach is to focus on
units of the extended family that are not co-resident, and so in which the shared
services can be assumed to be zero. For example, Jensen (2003) showed that each
unit increase in public pension income in South Africa reduced receipt of private
transfers from the pensioner’s children living outside the home by 0.20–0.30 units.
However, when considering public transfers paid to young adults, co-residence is
likely to represent a significant proportion of the support received from their
parents. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994), for example, use changes in welfare rules
over time and between states to show that a $1000 increase in Aid for Families with
Table 1 Eligibility thresholds
for EMA
Household income, per year EMA entitlement, per week
\£20,818 £30
£20,818–£25,521 £20
£25,522–£30,810 £10
[£30,810 Zero
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Dependent Children (AFDC) by young women with children reduces their
probability of receiving financial aid from their parents by 3.4 %, and of co-
residing by 4.7 %. While this provides evidence that the net benefit of the AFDC
programme is mainly captured by its recipients, the authors’ data do not enable them
to identify the effective rate at which parents ‘tax’ their children’s benefit receipt.
All students in our sample are co-resident with a parent,2 but we do not have data
on cash transfers made by parents to children receiving EMA, and we expect
additional unobserved heterogeneity in in-kind transfers or the items that children
are expected to purchase themselves. We therefore propose an alternative strategy to
identify the net change in the child’s opportunity set, which does not depend on any
survey instruments designed to capture intrahousehold transfers. Our identification
strategy instead stems from the insight, formalised in the theoretical model set out in
Sect. 2, that if parents respond to the child’s receipt of EMA by withdrawing cash
and in-kind transfers of an equal value (consistent with the parent ‘fully insuring’
the child’s consumption), then the child’s opportunity set is unchanged, and he
should not alter his labour supply. Correspondingly, the larger the child’s reduction
in labour supply, the smaller the redistributive response made by parents, or
equivalently, the greater the proportion of the EMA the child has been permitted to
keep.
We use data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE),
deposited by the Department for Education and National Centre for Social Research
(2012). We observe the labour supply and EMA receipt of a cohort of individuals in
their final year of compulsory schooling (during which no-one received EMA) and
first 2 years of post-compulsory schooling (during which teenagers whose parents
met the income criteria were eligible to receive EMA). Our data are outlined in
detail in Sect. 3, below. To pre-empt our results, estimates from linear, Tobit and
logistic regression methods in both cross-sectional and panel data frameworks
firmly reject a model of effectively altruistic parents. An EMA payment of £30 per
week reduces teenage labour supply by between 2.4 and 3.2 h per week at the
intensive margin. These results are robust to estimation on the sub-sample of non-
credit-constrained households, for whom we argue participation in post-compulsory
education is unlikely to be affected by eligibility for EMA. Using estimates of
teenagers’ labour supply response to unearned income obtained from elsewhere in
the literature (Dustmann et al. 2009; Wulff Pabilonia 2001), we calculate this to be
consistent with parents withdrawing cash and in-kind transfers from the child to
between 22 and 86 % of the value of EMA.
While the (non-) altruistic behaviour of parents has implications for the targeting
of transfers—our results indicate that the child’s welfare benefit from EMA is
higher than had an equivalent transfer been made to parents—the labour supply
effect of EMA has implications for the efficacy of conditional cash transfers in
raising educational performance. In-school employment is widespread. In our data,
43 % of 17 year-olds in the first year of post-compulsory education are in
employment. In-school employment may improve teenagers’ stock of cognitive and
non-cognitive human capital (for example, financial literacy, communication skills
2 We drop teenagers in social care from our sample.
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and lower discount rates—Oettinger 1999; Light 2001) or preference for education
as a route to higher-skilled work in future (Dustmann and van Soest 2007).
However, by crowding out time and effort devoted to study (e.g. Kalenkoski and
Wulff Pabilonia 2013) it may reduce the child’s educational performance,
particularly above a moderate number of hours per week or in close proximity to
high-stakes examinations (Lillydahl 1990; Ruhm 1997; Payne 2004). Hence, to the
extent that EMA reduces labour supply at least at the higher end of the working
hours distribution, this should feed through to an improvement in their academic
and future labour market outcomes.3
While there are indications from hypothetical questions that EMA reduced
recipients’ labour supply (RCU Market Research 2007), to our knowledge we are
the first to quantify this labour supply effect using observational data. Although
EMA closed to new applicants in England in January 2011, it was replaced by the
‘16–19 bursary’ programme, with a smaller budget of £180 m, and automatic
entitlement reduced in scope to approximately 12,000 of the ‘‘most vulnerable’’
students. EMA has been retained in the rest of the UK. It will be important for
policymakers to account for the labour supply effect of this scheme in considering
any future reforms.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Part 2 sets out a model
showing how the labour supply response to EMA provides a test for the presence of
an effectively altruistic head-of-household. Part 3 discusses the data and estimation
strategy, Part 4 presents the results and Part 5 sets out the conclusions and
recommendations.
2 Theoretical and empirical model
In this section we develop a theoretical model for the joint determination of parental
transfers and the child’s labour supply. We follow closely the structure of Dustmann
et al. (2009) and Kalenkoski and Wulff Pabilonia (2010) but extend their analysis to
account for (1) the introduction of EMA—an exogenous cash transfer paid to the
child—and (2) endogenous selection into post-compulsory education as a function
of potential receipt of EMA, parental transfers and labour supply.
We assume that if the child is not in full-time education he will earn the utility
U0, which we treat as exogenously determined. If U0 exceeds the maximum utility
attainable from being in full-time education, as determined by the model we now
outline, the child will leave full-time education. We return to the issue of
endogenous selection into post-compulsory education in Sect. 2.2.
Our structural parameter of interest is the amount k, by which parental transfers
are reduced for every pound the child receives in EMA. We face the challenge that
there exist no data on cash transfers received by LSYPE sample members in post-
compulsory education. More broadly however, even where information on cash
transfers is elicited, researchers typically still lack data on in-kind transfers and the
items which children are expected to pay for themselves, which are required for
3 We do not evaluate this effect directly, and discuss the challenges in doing so in our conclusions.
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complete identification of models of parental altruism.4 Our model shows how the
child’s labour supply response to EMA can be used for inference about parents’
withdrawal of both cash and in-kind transfers.
We assume two agents; a selfish child and altruistic parent. Each holds full
information about the preferences of the other. Both wish to maximise the present
value of their expected lifetime utility. The parent’s altruism may be impure, in that
she values the child’s academic performance more highly than does the child. Each
agent may discount future utility at different rates, or hold distinct beliefs about how
current behaviour will impact upon future opportunities.
The parent announces a contingent rule specifying the baseline transfer she will
make if the child is in full-time education and working zero hours T, and the amount
by which the transfer will be reduced for every pound the child earns in the labour
market t. It is costless to set and revise the transfer level. (Any announcement or
child’s expectation about the support to be provided if the child is not in full-time
education is built into the reservation utility U0).
The child is assumed to have no bargaining power. His outside option or threat
point, known to the parent, is the utility gained from leaving full-time education U0.
The parent’s preference for the child’s academic performance gives the child scope
to extract bargaining power through the threat to withdraw from full-time education.
However, here we follow Burton et al. (2002) and Schmidt (1993) in assuming that
the parent has developed a reputation, and that the child’s discount rate is
sufficiently high that he takes the parent’s strategy as given. This means the child
cannot credibly commit to this self-damaging action.
Taking this parental strategy as given, the child then chooses his labour supply
l 2 ½0; 1 at a constant wage w (and effective wage ð1  tÞw), to maximise his utility
function UðC; LÞ defined over consumption (C) and leisure (L), which comprises all
non-labour market activities. Normalising the total time available to unity
imposesL ¼ 1  l. The function UðC; LÞ is assumed to be strictly increasing, twice
differentiable and strictly quasiconcave in its arguments. The child’s concerns
regarding future consumption or academic performance are nested within his utility
from leisure.
Without EMA, the child’s only source of unearned income,x, is the transfer from
parents. Rewriting U in terms of labour supply, the child’s problem can be defined
as:
max
C;l
UðC; 1  lÞ subject to C  T þ ð1  tÞwl ð1Þ
Assuming that leisure is a normal good over the relevant domain ensures that the
child’s optimal labour supply l is non-increasing in unearned income, x, and
strictly decreasing for for l  [ 0:
4 The age 16 sweep of the UK’s National Child Development Study of a cohort born in 1958 and studied
by Dustmann et al. 2009, is an exception.
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ol
ox
 0 if l   0
ol
ox
\0 if l  [ 0
ð2Þ
We also assume that optimal labour supply is non-decreasing in the effective
wage, 1  tð Þw; and strictly increasing for l  [ 0:
ol
oð 1  tð ÞwÞ 0 if l   0
ol
oð 1  tð ÞwÞ[ 0 if l  [ 0
ð3Þ
The child will undertake paid employment if and only if the effective wage
exceeds the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption at the initial
endowment point. Formally this may be expressed as:
l*[ 0 iff ð1  tÞw[ o UðT; 1Þ=o L
oUðT ; 1Þ=oC
l* ¼ 0 iff ð1  tÞw o UðT; 1Þ=o L
oUðT ; 1Þ=oC
ð4Þ
Finally, we define for each child a reservation utility U0, equal to that which
could be obtained by leaving full-time education. If this is not attainable at the
optimum position, the child will not participate in post-compulsory full-time
education.
This model formalizes the stylized facts from the literature (Dustmann et al.
2009; Kalenkoski and Wulff Pabilonia 2010; Wolff 2006; Gong 2009) that,
conditioning on the child being in full-time education, (1) parents provide smaller
transfers, or are less likely to provide positive transfers, the more the child works,
other things equal, and (2) children undertake less employment, the greater the
transfer received from parents, other things equal. Equations (1–4) also accommo-
date a discrete choice framework wherein the probability of working positive hours
is non-increasing in unearned income and non-decreasing in the effective wage. A
discrete framework may be more appropriate if employers are unwilling to hire
individuals for less than a minimum number of hours each week.
Retaining the notation developed above, the model is summarised in Figs. 1 and
2. Reservation utility (that which the child would gain by leaving compulsory
education) is represented by indifference curve IC0. Higher indifference curves
represent higher utility. The budget constraint (BC) represents the upper bound of
the child’s opportunity set for l[ 0. Interior optima are defined by the tangency of
budget constraint and indifference curve. Figure 1 shows the case with a fixed lump-
sum transfer (T1), and a varying ‘tax rate’ on the child’s earnings (t). Here, the
lump-sum transfer T1 is just sufficient to ensure that the child does not need to take
employment in order to meet his education participation constraint. The parent can
then induce zero hours of work by ‘taxing’ the child’s income at a rate of 100 %
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(setting t ¼ 1), while still ensuring the child stays in education. Reducing t raises the
effective wage, increasing the slope of the budget constraint and improving the
child’s welfare as higher indifference curves become attainable. In line with our
assumption in Eq. (3), reducing the tax rate and raising the effective net wage is
here shown to induce longer hours of work.
Figure 2 shows the case with a fixed tax rate (t ¼ t), but varying the size of the
initial lump-sum transfer. A child offered T1 will, at zero hours of work, be
indifferent between staying in and leaving full-time education, but by undertaking
his optimum labour supply lðx ¼ T1Þ will have strictly higher utility than the
reservation level. A child in this situation will therefore continue in full time
education. His welfare can be further improved by raising the lump sum transfer to
T2. In line with our assumption in Eq. (2), conditioning on meeting the participation
constraint, increasing the child’s unearned income is here shown to induce shorter
hours of work. In Fig. 2 however, a child offered T0, for example, cannot attain his
reservation utility at any level of employment. Without additional financial support
from outside the household, he will leave full time education.
C
ɭ
T1
IC0
IC3
IC4
T
BC4 (ω=T2)
ɭ*(ω=T2) ɭ*(ω=T1)
BC3 (ω=T1)
BC0.2 (ω=T0)
T0
2
Fig. 2 Labour supply with
t = t* and x varying (varying
lump-sum transfer, fixed ‘tax
rate’)
C
ɭ
T1 BC0.1 (t=1)
BC1 (0<t*<1)
BC2 (t=0)
IC0
IC1
IC2
ɭ*(t=0)ɭ*(t=t*)ɭ*(t=1)=0
Fig. 1 Labour supply with
x = T0 and t varying (fixed
lump-sum transfer, varying ‘tax
rate’)
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2.1 Introducing EMA
Let us then introduce an additional source of unearned income paid straight to the
child; EMA. We first consider the situation of an individual whose education-
participation constraint is satisfied without EMA. For this group, EMA can be
treated as exogenous, conditional on the parent’s income. (The maximum annual
difference in EMA payments from moving into a lower income bracket—£390—is
too small for parents profitably to ‘fine-tune’ their true income).5
In Fig. 3, EMA initially induces a vertical upward shift in the child’s budget
constraint. However, in response, the parent may choose to reduce the transfer T by
some proportion k 2 ½0; 1 of the value of EMA received by the child. (A lower k
permits the child to ‘keep’ an increasing proportion of his EMA). The expression for
the child’s unearned income is now:
x ¼ T þ ð1  kÞ  EMA ð5Þ
The parent’s response to earned income, defined by t, is assumed not to change.
The child’s problem can now be written:
max
C;l
UðC; 1  lÞ subject to C  T þ ð1  kÞEMA þ ð1  tÞwl ð6Þ
If k ¼ 1, the child’s EMA is entirely offset by an equivalent reduction in the
transfer from the parent. This leaves the child’s budget constraint unchanged
compared with the initial situation. With the same opportunity set, the child’s
working hours should also remain unchanged. Hence, if we observe a negative
labour supply response to EMA, this implies k\1, and we can reject the null
hypothesis of ‘full insurance’, or parents isolating their children from any income
variation.6 However, as EMA is an exogenous payment to the child, it does not
C
ɭ
T0
BC1 (ω=T0, i.e. λ=1)
IC1
IC2
IC3
T0+(1-λ)EMA
T0 + EMA
BC2 (ω=T0 +(1-λ)EMA, for 0<λ<1 )
BC3 (ω=T0 + EMA, i.e λ=0)
ɭ*1( ω=T0 +(1-λ)EMA)
ɭ*2(ω=T0+EMA)
ɭ*0(ω=T0)
Fig. 3 Introducing EMA to the labour supply model
5 £10 per week, 39 weeks per year.
6 Failure to reject a labour supply response of zero is not sufficient to conclude that parents are fully
insuring their children. This could result from an income-elasticity of labour supply of zero. However, a
negative labour supply response is sufficient to reject both an income elasticity of zero and full insurance.
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constitute a zero-sum redistribution of household resources. This means that to
reject a null hypothesis of an effectively altruistic parent (who redistributes
resources so as to maximise household welfare) we must reject kð1  hÞ, where h
is the parent’s marginal propensity to transfer to the child out of her own income.
We do not have the data to test this directly, but present back-of-the-envelope
calculations appealing to results elsewhere in the literature.
2.2 Endogenous selection into full-time education
The policy objective of EMA was to increase participation in post-compulsory
education. Dearden et al. (2009) provide an evaluation based on a pilot scheme in
matched areas of England, and concluded that EMA raised participation by eligible
young people in the first year of post-compulsory schooling by 4.5 percentage
points, from a base of 65 %. The effect was larger among children living in rented
accommodation or social care. The authors suggest this provides evidence that the
principal mechanism by which EMA increases participation is by easing credit or
liquidity constraints rather than simply reducing the opportunity cost of education.
In our model, the condition for EMA to induce a child to stay in full-time
education is illustrated in case B of Fig. 4. Net of the parent’s response, adding
EMA to the child’s effective budget constraint must make the reservation utility
newly attainable. If the initial parental transfer were any smaller than in case B, the
child would still be worse-off in full-time education and receiving EMA than if he
dropped out (case A). On the other hand, if the initial parental transfer were
sufficiently larger the child would continue in full-time education even without
EMA (case C). EMA is therefore a binding consideration in the education
participation decision of only a narrow group of people.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the treated group (receiving EMA) is fundamentally
different to the non-treated group in that it contains some individuals (‘inducees’)
C C C
ɭ ɭ ɭ
Key: 
Reservaon Ulity, IC0:
Budget Constraint without EMA, BCN: C= T0 + (1-t)w
Eﬀecve Budget Constraint with EMA, BCE: C =T0 + (1-t)w + (1-λ)EMA
Case A: Child never 
parcipates.
Case B: Child induced 
to parcipate by EMA.
Case C: Child always 
parcipates.
IC0 IC0 IC0
T0 T0
T0BCN
BCN
BCNBCE
BCE
BCE
Fig. 4 How EMA may affect the decision to participate in post-compulsory education
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who are only present in full time education because they receive EMA. The non-
treated group (non-recipients in full-time education) only contains individuals who
would have continued in full time education without EMA.
In the LSYPE, household income for the first year of post-compulsory schooling
is recorded only in bands. The thresholds of these do not accord with those for EMA
eligibility, and the period which income is recorded does not correspond to that over
which eligibility is determined. Moreover, no information on parental income is
collected at all during the second year of post-compulsory schooling. (Considerable
information is instead collected on own income and benefit receipt among those
cohort members who had left full-time education). This makes it impractical to
assign a counterfactual EMA status for those who did not continue in education and
thus model the role of EMA in the selection process empirically. Instead, we present
a series of empirical specifications and show that our results are robust to a series of
assumptions under which the bias caused by inducees (or indeed, other unobserved
differences between EMA recipients and non-recipients) is eliminated.
Dearden et al. (2009, p. 837) argue that most inducees were drawn from
‘‘financially unproductive activities’’ rather than paid work. This suggests that the
type of individual for whom EMA makes a difference to continued education is poorly
motivated with respect to labour market activities, or more likely to live in deprived
areas where there are fewer opportunities to work. We are able to proxy for local
labour market opportunities using regional dummies and the Index of Multiple
Deprivation for the child’s area of residence. Assuming there is no residual difference
in unobserved motivation between recipients and non-recipients, our separate cross-
sectional estimates for students in the first (wave 4) and second (wave 5) years of post-
compulsory schooling will be unbiased. However, if, conditional on our set of
individual and household characteristics, the child’s motivation is positively
correlated with hours of work and negatively correlated with EMA, the estimated
labour supply effect of EMA will be downward biased. In addition, therefore, we
control for time invariant differences in unobserved individual motivation or labour
market opportunities using fixed-effect regression and conditional fixed-effect logit
models. We also re-estimate our models using non-credit-constrained households,
who we argue will not have been influenced by EMA when making their education
participation decision, and show that the labour supply effect of EMA for this group
does not significantly differ from that for the general population. We undertake
additional robustness and sensitivity analyses by estimating on the sub-sample of
male and female cohort members, and those interviewed during school term time.
3 Data
We use data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE),
which tracked a cohort of individuals born between 1st September 1989 and 31st
August 1990, and so in the same academic year at school. We use data from the
third wave, conducted mainly in March-June of 2006, when respondents were 15 or
16 years old and in their final year of compulsory education, and the fourth and fifth
waves, conducted mainly in June-July of 2007 and 2008 when respondents were
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16–17 and 17–18 years old and those continuing in post-compulsory education were
in their first and second years respectively. In wave 4, of the 11,801 respondents,
8971 were in full time education. 4359 of these received EMA and 3795 reported
positive hours of paid employment. Corresponding figures for wave 5 are 10,430
(reflecting sample attrition), 6953 (additionally reflecting dropout from full-time
education), 3384 (take-up of EMA remained the same among those still in
education) and 3632 (so a larger proportion of those in education had a part-time job
at wave 5 than wave 4). There are no data documenting cash or in-kind transfers
from parents, and what the child is required to pay for himself. We do observe the
level of EMA received and their usual weekly hours of paid employment.
The profile of EMA take-up against household income in both waves 4 and 5 of
the LSYPE, together with raw sample numbers, is shown in Table 2. Our data show
substantial numbers of both students who would be eligible for EMA according to
their current or previous year’s household income but do not receive EMA, and
apparently ineligible students who do receive EMA. Those in the second group may
have experienced a rise in family income after having applied for EMA, but retained
their entitlement until the end of the academic year (only then must they reapply).
They may instead have obtained EMA through false reporting of household income,
or be reporting income in the survey with error.
Non-take-up will partly depend on observed characteristics. For example, the
informational demands when applying for EMA are greatest for those with self-
employed parents, and the opportunity cost of parents’ time (to help with the
Table 2 Take-up of EMA in estimation sample, by household income band and entitlement bracket
Annual household
income band (measured
in wave 4)
Conditional on participation in full-time education
Wave 4 Wave 5 Weekly
EMA
entitlementSub-
sample
size
EMA
recipients
EMA
take-up
(%)
Sub-
sample
size
EMA
recipients
EMA
take-up
(%)
\£2600 74 56 75.68 48 39 81.25 £30
£2,600–£5,199 220 180 81.82 150 122 81.33
£5200–£10,399 617 573 87.03 422 355 84.12
£10,400–£15,599 834 711 85.25 543 457 84.16
£15,600–£20,799 698 580 83.09 474 390 82.28
£20,800–£25,999 675 491 72.74 438 315 71.92 £10, £20 or
£30
£26,000–£31,199 664 371 54.37 448 236 52.68 Zero or £10
£31,200–£36,399 525 134 25.52 365 69 18.90 Zero
£36,400–£41,599 461 67 14.53 325 37 11.38
£41,600–£46,799 417 36 8.63 284 22 7.75
£46,800–£51,999 410 23 5.61 281 15 5.34
C£52,000 1405 36 2.56 1011 19 1.88
All 7000 3212 45.89 4789 2076 43.35
Contains all observations for which neither household income nor EMA receipt entries are missing
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application) is likely to be related to their income and occupation. An omitted
variables bias will occur if receipt of EMA is partially correlated with omitted
variables that also help determine working hours. For example, more highly
motivated teenagers are likely to pursue the application process most ardently, while
also being likely to work longer hours, other things equal. This will positively bias
the labour supply effect of EMA.
Hourly wages are not directly elicited. Instead of introducing measurement error
by dividing weekly earnings by weekly hours, and necessitating a selection model
(since the counterfactual wage of those not in employment is not observed), we omit
wages from our model and assume they are partially uncorrelated with receipt of
EMA. This assumption seems plausible. As argued by Wolff (2006), the teenagers
considered here are likely to work predominantly at fixed hourly rates of pay close to
the legal minimum wage. Motivation or any other unobserved personality traits,
which may also affect receipt of EMA, are unlikely to be rewarded with higher wages.
We do control for a full range of covariates that might be expected to influence the
child’s and/or parent’s attitudes to the child’s employment and study, the parents’
attitudes to transfers, and local labour market conditions. These include housing
tenure, a measure of local deprivation, the employment status and qualifications of the
parents, and household income. We include household income in our models with
terms for the midpoint of the reported income band, its square, and a dummy each for
missing and topcoded observations.7 Household income is not recorded in wave 5, so
we substitute the wave 4 value. We discuss the bias this induces in each specification
in the results section. As the survey is linked to the National Pupil Database, we can
also control for prior educational performance up to age 16.
Sample descriptive statistics for selected explanatory variables are set out in
Table 3. Here, we show that participation in full-time education tends to be lower
among those living in deprived areas or lower income households, or those with
parents from lower educational backgrounds. Participation is also substantially
lower among males than females, and among those whose parents are ‘credit-
constrained’; defined in accordance with Dearden et al. (2009), as those living in
rented accommodation or social care; than those who are not.
Among those participating in full-time education, those in employment are
positively selected by socio-economic background. Children from progressively
higher income households have higher unconditional mean hours of work and a
greater probability of working positive hours, except at the very highest income band
in wave 4 (a flattening off at around 58 % occurs from a lower band in wave 5). A
similar pattern is observed in relation to local deprivation (in wave 4 children from
more affluent areas work more, until reaching the least deprived quintile, while in
wave 5 the pattern is monotonic) and parental qualifications (the tendency to work is
lowest for the children of parents with no qualifications, rising for those of parents
with GCSEs (age 16) and A-Level (age 18 or university entrance) qualifications in
turn, but falling again for those of parents with degrees).
7 Results, not shown for reasons of space, do not change if dummies for each income band are used
instead, though standard errors are marginally greater with this less parsimonious approach, in which the
degree of collinearity with the lower income bands and EMA receipt is higher.
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Those receiving EMA of £30 per week work substantially less than those
receiving lower payments or none, but particularly in wave 5, this is substantially
accounted for by the lower propensity to work at all, rather than a reduction in hours
conditional on working. For this reason we shall present results for both the choice
of hours, and the discrete choice to work positive hours.
4 Results
To estimate the effect of EMA on hours of employment we use Tobit regressions in
cross-sectional and random-effects panel data specifications. We expect there to be
unobserved heterogeneity in individuals’ work opportunities or motivation, but
individual fixed-effects cannot be conditioned out of the Tobit estimator, and
implementing a fixed-effects Tobit with individual dummy variables will produce
biased estimates. Therefore, we also present linear fixed- and random-effect
specifications and Hausman tests for presence of this unobserved heterogeneity.
Cross-sectional OLS regressions are also presented for an indication of the baseline
conditional correlation between EMA receipt and the level of labour supply. In our
linear specifications we treat observations with zero hours in the same way as those
with positive hours. For the discrete choice to work positive hours we estimate logistic
regressions with results presented as the odds ratio for working positive hours. The
logit is chosen in preference to the probit because it enables the implementation of a
conditional fixed-effects estimator. Our regressors of interest are dummy variables for
receipt of £10, £20, or £30 payments of EMA each week. Our standard errors account
for clustered sampling at the school level.
We present our results in two parts, discussing firstly the results from estimates
for the cross-section of children observed in their first year, and then in their second
year, of post-compulsory schooling (aged 16–17, and 17–18 respectively). Secondly
we present estimates exploiting changes in receipt of EMA over time within
individuals due to (1) meeting the income eligibility criteria on entering the first-
year of post-compulsory education, and (2) transitioning into or out of eligibility
between the first and second years of post-compulsory schooling.
4.1 Cross-sectional specifications
Estimates obtained using the cross-section of individuals in full-time education in
waves 4 and 5 are shown in Table 4. The results show a significant negative
correlation between receipt of the highest category of EMA (£30 per week) and both
hours of employment and the probability of working positive hours, conditional on
observed characteristics, and also a negative monotonic relationship between the size
of EMA payments and their coefficient for labour supply (though the effect of the
smaller payments is significant at, at best, only the 10 % level). We note that to the
extent to which unobserved motivation or labour market opportunities are negatively
correlated with receipt of EMA, these downward represent biased estimates of the
causal effect of EMA on child’s labour supply. This exercise nevertheless provides an
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indication of the difference in the inference from the linear specification, which does
not account for censoring at zero, and the Tobit, which does.
For example, the OLS estimates show the best linear prediction is that EMA of
£30 per week reduces employment by 1.3 h per week in wave 4, and 1.5 h in
wave 5. The interpretation of the Tobit estimates, on the other hand, is that EMA
of £30 per week reduces desired labour supply by just over 3 h per week on
average (this figure accounts for individuals who reach zero hours but might still
prefer more leisure and less consumption). The OLS coefficients are smaller in
absolute value because observations of zero hours are treated in the same way as
positive hours, meaning the observed effect of EMA is capped by the fact that
hours worked cannot fall below zero. That EMA has a significant negative
association with employment at the extensive margin is clear from the logit
model. Receipt of £30 per week EMA reduces the odds of participation by
slightly more than 30 %. The wave 4 and wave 5 odds ratios of 0.662 and 0.704
are equivalent to marginal effects on the probability of participation of -9.7 and
-8.4 percentage points from a base of 43 %.
We note that, since we are controlling for wave 4 income in the wave 5 models
(household income not being collected in wave 5), receipt of EMA in wave 5 will be
negatively correlated with the measurement error in income. Households receiving
EMA will on average have a lower income than accounted for by our observed
covariates, meaning lower parental transfers and higher child employment. We
expect this to positively bias our wave 5 results, towards a coefficient of zero or
odds ratio of one. Nevertheless, the difference in coefficients between waves is
never statistically significant.
Table 4 Cross-sectional specifications: marginal effects on hours worked and probability of working
positive hours
EMA Marginal effects on hours worked Odds ratios for probability of
working positive hours
OLS Tobit Logit
Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 4 Wave 5
£10 -0.323
(-0.421)
0.044
(0.649)
-0.285
(0.791)
-0.464
(1.174)
1.003
(0.115)
0.895
(0.142)
£20 -0.686*
(0.283)
-0.865
(0.585)
-1.430*
(0.838)
-1.919*
(1.136)
0.830
(0.097)
0.785
(0.121)
£30 -1.267***
(0.283)
-1.508***
(0.362)
-3.096***
(0.629)
-3.201***
(0.778)
0.662***
(0.053)
0.704***
(0.066)
N 7517 4907 7517 4907 7561 5013
R2/Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.14
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01. Additional controls:
household income (measured at wave 4 in both specifications), socio-economic class, parent’s highest
qualification, local deprivation index, region, type of school attended, prior academic performance at age
11 and 14, quarter of birth, ethnicity, parental employment, sibling composition, lone parent, sex, free
school meal eligibility
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4.2 Panel data specifications
We now discuss estimates for the labour supply effect of EMA in fixed- and random-
effect panel data specifications. The purpose of controlling for individual fixed effects
is to eliminate the effect of time invariant unobserved individual differences in
motivation, ability, household resources or labour market opportunities, and so,
provided there are no time-varying unobserved differences of this nature correlated
with receipt of EMA within-person, to produce consistent estimates of the effect of
EMA on labour supply. The random effects specifications are inconsistent in the
presence of time-invariant unobserved effects correlated with EMA, but in their
absence, constitute the more efficient estimator. We conduct Hausman tests for the
presence of time-invariant unobserved effects, in order to select our preferred model.
These estimates are presented for the balanced panel of individuals observed in
full-time education over two alternative time periods. Estimates of the labour supply
effect of EMA are first shown for waves 3–4, the final year of compulsory and first
year of post-compulsory schooling. No-one was eligible for EMA during
compulsory schooling, so here the fixed-effect estimates are identified by transitions
into receipt of EMA for those meeting the income criteria compared with those not
meeting the income criteria on entering post-compulsory education. We next show
results for waves 4–5, the first 2 years of post-compulsory schooling, and during
both of which EMA was available to all those meeting the income criteria. Here the
fixed-effect estimates are identified by within-person transitions in receipt of EMA
between the two waves. Here, however, because no data on household income is
available in wave 5, there is likely to be an unobserved, time varying, reduction in
household resources associated with a transition into receipt of EMA. This violates
the identifying assumption of fixed-effects regression. Since a reduction in
household resources will, other things equal, reduce parental transfers and increase
labour supply, we expect this specification to produce positively biased coefficients
for the labour supply effect of EMA.
We might also expect differences in the source of identification of these
specifications to produce different results. In the wave 3–4 specification all of those
who receive EMA in wave 4 undergo a transition, while in the wave 4–5 specification,
only those who subsequently lose their EMA, or gain EMA for the first time, in wave
five undergo a transition. This latter group is likely to come from more affluent
households, with incomes closer to the eligibility threshold on average. On a related
note, we also show that the standard errors in the fixed-effect specifications for waves
4–5 are approximately twice the size of those estimated for waves 3–4, due to the
smaller number of transitions in receipt of EMA contributing to identification.8
The results for the key coefficients on receipt of EMA from the models on both time
periods are shown in Table 5. (The coefficients on the complete set of explanatory
8 We also estimated on all three waves, and obtained results not statistically different from either
specification presented here. We focus on our two wave models for clarity about the source of
identification: in the three-wave model, the fixed-effect estimates are identified by changes in EMA
receipt both due to meeting the income criteria on reaching the eligible age-group, and movements into
and out of eligibility among those already old enough. As with the wave 4–5 specification, the 3–5
estimates are also biased by the absence of wave 5 income requiring us to treat income as time invariant.
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variables for all the specifications shown here are presented in Appendix Table 8). We
may generally state from Table 5 that the monotonic relationship between the size of
EMA payments and their coefficient in determining labour supply seen for the cross-
sectional results is borne out in all the specifications shown in Table 5, but that in all
but one case (the random-effects linear regression for waves 4–5) the estimated effect
of the highest payment of EMA is larger than seen in the cross-sectional estimates
(reductions in hours between 1.7 and 2 per week, and odds of participation between 40
and 50 %, equivalent to between 12.1 and 15.5 percentage points).
Focusing on the linear fixed-effect specifications, we estimate from our wave 3–4
specification that a transition into receipt of £30 EMA on entering post-compulsory
schooling reduces labour supply by 1.9 h per week: and from our wave 4–5
specification that a transition into EMA receipt during post-compulsory schooling
reduces labour supply by 1.7 h per week. The wave 4–5 coefficient is positively
biased (towards zero) due to the omission of time varying household income from
this specification, but in this case the Hausman test does not reject equality of the
random and fixed-effects coefficient vectors, so we interpret the random effects
coefficient here of -1.3 h as a more efficient estimate of this upper bound.
Turning now to the participation decision at the extensive margin, the conditional
fixed effects logit model produces consistent estimates for the wave 3–4
specification but (as with the wave 4–5 specification), the Hausman test rejects
consistency of the more efficient random-effects logit. Our interpretation is
therefore that receipt of £30 EMA reduces the odds of participation in employment
by 43 %, or the probability by approximately 13 percentage points from the wave 4
level. Although we expect the omission of household income in the wave 4–5 model
to produce positively biased estimates the odds ratio estimated for this period is only
marginally closer to one, and not statistically or economically different.
Although for waves 4–5, the Hausman test cannot reject consistency of the linear
random effects specification, the Hausman test does reject consistency of the random
effects logit on participation. As a result, we are reluctant to make any claim about the
consistency of the random-effects Tobit estimator in this context. Nevertheless, we
note that the interpretation in the wave 4–5 specification, that receipt of EMA of £30
per week reduces desired labour supply by just over 3 h per week, is identical to that
obtained in both waves’ cross-sectional estimates, and larger in absolute value than its
linear counterpart in the same proportion as for the cross-sectional estimates. The
wave 3–4 estimate is somewhat smaller in absolute value (albeit both estimates have
large standard errors and are not significantly different), with £30 per week EMA
reducing desired labour supply by just 2.4 h per week.
Differences between our wave 3–4 and wave 4–5 results may also be due to
heterogeneous effects driven by the composition of the treated group (those affected
by changes in EMA receipt during post-compulsory education will be more affluent
on average than those gaining EMA on entry into post-compulsory education), by the
age of the cohort (parents’ willingness to make transfers to their children, and
children’s relative valuation of consumption and leisure may change with increasing
expectations of independence), and by the composition of the sample (those still
observed in education in wave 5 will be more positively selected with respect to
educational aspirations and expectations). Nevertheless, we point to the stability of
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the coefficients obtained with each estimator across the cross-sectional and panel data
settings. From the linear and logit specifications, we argue that a representative range
for the net labour supply effect of £30 per week EMA is an 8–13 % percentage point
Table 5 Panel data effects on hours worked and probability of working positive hours
Marginal effects on hours worked Odds ratios for probability of
working positive hours
Linear regression Tobit Logit
Random-
effects
Fixed-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Conditional fixed-
effects
Waves 3–4
EMA £10 -0.088
(0.408)
0.307
(0.415)
0.262
(0.742)
1.054
(0.145)
0.950
(0.216)
EMA £20 -0.666*
(0.395)
-0.774
(0.431)
-1.125
(0.729)
0.767**
(0.102)
0.608**
(0.124)
EMA £30 -1.781***
(0.208)
-
1.869***
(0.203)
-2.358***
(0.408)
0.592***
(0.046)
0.574***
(0.062)
Hausman test
v2 (p value)
37.64
(0.0003)
– 26.75
(0.0134)
R2|Log
(pseudo)likelihood
0.1656
Overall
0.2187
Within
-25,152.63 -8196.90 -1230.12
N 7150 7150 7150 8046 2387
Waves 4–5
EMA £10 -0.355
(0.395)
-0.894
(0.621)
-1.035
(0.770)
0.849
(0.131)
0.902
(0.289)
EMA £20 -0.791**
(0.369)
-0.957*
(0.565)
-1.780**
(0.775)
0.731**
(0.112)
0.871
(0.313)
EMA £30 -1.311***
(0.245)
-
1.713***
(0.476)
-3.219***
(0.531)
0.504***
(0.051)
0.560**
(0.154)
Hausman test
v2 (p value)
9.91
(0.3579)
– 53.85
(0.0000)
R2|Log
(pseudo)likelihood
0.0979
Overall
0.0388
Within
-21,983.71 -5969.02 -679.11
N 4608 4608 4608 4745 1074
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05, *** p\ 0.01. Hausman test conducted
assuming no clusters. Conditional fixed-effect logit standard errors not cluster robust. Sample size for
conditional fixed effects logit is number of individuals transitioning into or out of employment. R2 is
‘overall R2’ for random-effects regression, and ‘within R2’ for fixed-effects regression. Log likelihood
reported for conditional fixed-effects logit, and log-pseudolikelihood for the random effects specifica-
tions. Additional controls: Time-varying: Household income (wave 3–4 specification only), type of school
attended, parental employment, lone parent. Time invariant: Household income (not observed in wave 5,
so held constant at wave 4 value in wave 4–5 specification), socio-economic class, parent’s highest
qualification, local deprivation index, region, prior academic performance at age 11 and 14, quarter of
birth, ethnicity,, sibling composition, sex, free school meal eligibility
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reduction in the probability of working positive hours and a 1.25–1.9 reduction in
actual hours worked per week, and that the reduction in desired hours is larger, and
though not bounded, in the order of magnitude of 2.4–3.2 h per week.
4.3 Inference on parental altruism
The negative labour supply response we observe here, which is significantly
different from zero in all specifications, is sufficient to reject that k ¼ 1;
representing ‘full insurance’ by parents. However, these estimates do not recover
structural parameters regarding the magnitude of the parental response. For
inference towards these, we appeal to results elsewhere in the literature. For the UK
in 1974, Dustmann et al. (2009) indicate that 16-year-olds work 0.307 h less each
week for each additional £1 transferred from parents. For the US in 1997, Wulff
Pabilonia (2001), indicates that the earnings of 16-year-olds fell by $0.654 per $1 of
parental transfer. If children in the UK reduce their earnings by the same proportion
per pound of parental transfer, then at the median wage of those working positive
hours in our estimation sample (£4.77) this equates to children working 0.137 h per
week less for every pound received in additional transfers.
The ratio of the labour supply response to EMA (taking into account the
reduction in transfers made by the parents) to either estimate of the child’s labour
supply response to all unearned income gives an estimate for the net increase in the
child’s unearned income, or equivalently, the amount of his EMA which the child is
permitted to ‘keep’. In their estimates, both Dustmann et al. (2009) and Wulff
Pabilonia (2001) account for the censoring of hours worked at zero, so using this
strategy it is the desired reduction in labour supply, rather than linear prediction,
which enables identification of the parameter of interest, k.
Our Tobit results suggest that, on receiving an EMA payment of £30 per week, a
teenager would, on average, like to reduce his labour supply by between 2.4 and
3.2 h. Assuming that the child treats cash from parents as a perfect substitute for
cash from the state, and his labour supply response to unearned income is equal to -
0.307 h per pound per week (as in Dustmann et al. 2009), this implies a net increase
in unearned income of between £7.82 and £10.42. Repeating this exercise using the
income-responsiveness of 0.137 h per pound per week obtained from Wulff
Pabilonia (2001) give a range of £17.52 to £23.36. Alternatively stated, in response
to a weekly EMA payment of £30, the parent withdraws cash transfers, extracts cash
contributions or compels the child directly to purchase goods previously provided in
kind, to a combined value at least £6.64 (in the theoretical framework set out here
implying k ¼ 0:22) but less than £22.18 (k ¼ 0:74) respectively. We acknowledge
that, without being able to condition on individual fixed-effects, the direction of the
bias in any individual Tobit estimate is indeterminate. However, the overall bias
must be smaller than that from the linear random-effects specification, which is
affected by the same omitted variables bias but additionally that caused by failure to
account for censoring at zero, which operates in the same direction. Therefore,
repeating this exercise using the coefficient obtained in the wave 4 OLS
specification (-1.267 h, the smallest in absolute value), we place a lower bound
on the net gain in unearned income of £4.13, giving k ¼ 0:86.
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The condition for parental behaviour to be consistent with an effective altruist
redistributing income to maximise household welfare is k ¼ ð1  hÞ, where h is the
parent’s marginal propensity to transfer cash to the child out of their own income.
Dustmann et al. (2009) estimate h ¼ 0:005, and at the mean parental income for
each sample subgroup, Kalenkoski and Wulff Pabilonia (2010) estimate h ¼ 0:015
for 2-year and 0:032 for 4-year college students. These figures correspond to
ð1  hÞ = 0.995, 0.985, and 0.968 respectively. The estimates of k calculated above
are all considerably smaller than this. Though ours is a rough calculation using
parameters obtained from different institutional backgrounds, the net effect of EMA
has clearly been to raise the child’s unearned income by substantially more than had
the equivalent transfer been made by parents. Thus, we reject both the ‘full
insurance’ and ‘effective altruist’ hypotheses.
4.4 Robustness checks
We now show that this conclusion is robust to a series of sensitivity checks. Results for
a series of sub-groups of the population; by household credit constraint, time of
interview, and gender; are shown in Table 6, estimated using eight of the specifications
discussed above. We do not show the wave 5 cross-sectional estimates, which are
likely to be most biased by measurement error in household income, or the random
effects linear and logit specifications, showing instead their (conditional-) fixed-effect
counterparts. Results for the whole estimation sample, but with subsets of control
variables omitted to reduce multicollinearity among the covariate vector, are shown in
Table 7, again for eight specifications. There we omit the fixed-effect estimators (since
the regressors we omit, all time invariant, have no bearing on the coefficients obtained)
and their random-effect counterparts, but show the random-effects Tobit results.
4.4.1 Non-credit-constrained sub-group
Following the reasoning of Dearden et al. (2009), EMA is less likely to be a binding
consideration in the child’s education participation decision for the children of non-
credit-constrained parents, here defined as those living in owner-occupied accom-
modation. Any bias due to endogenous selection into post-compulsory education
should not be present for this reduced sub-sample. The marginal effects of interest
for this group are presented in the top section of Table 6.
For the non-credit-constrained group, like the whole sample estimates, across the
first seven specifications the magnitude of the labour supply effect is greater for
EMA payments of £30 than of £20 and in turn £10, with only the estimates for £30
being persistently significant at the 5 or 1 % levels. (In common with all the sub-
samples shown in Table 6, there are very few transitions into and out of employment
between waves 4 and 5, producing very imprecise and in some case incorrectly
directioned, though never statistically significant, estimates of the odds ratio in the
wave 4–5 conditional fixed effect logit estimates. We do not discuss these further).
The Tobit estimates show the £30 payment to reduce the desired labour supply of
children in non-credit-constrained households by between 22 and 48 min more per
week than estimated for the overall population, though the difference in coefficients
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is not statistically significant. The wave 4–5 linear specification produces a small
and insignificant difference in the opposite direction, while differences in the
remaining coefficients are trivial.
This finding adds robustness to our rejection of the effective altruist model. Parents in
credit constrained households are more likely than those from non-credit-constrained
households to lack the ability to redistribute resources to maximise household welfare
but the balance of the estimates shown here suggests that altruistic redistributions are
the same size or smaller in magnitude for the group most able to make them.
4.4.2 Term-time interviews
Some interviews took place in the school holidays, when EMA is not paid. The
survey question about receipt of EMA asks ‘‘Do you get Education Maintenance
Allowance?’’ In the main results shown here we assumed that interviewees respond
according to what they receive during term time. We also assumed that the survey
question regarding employment, emphasising hours ‘‘usually’’ worked, is interpreted
to refer to term time, except in wave 3, where this qualification is explicitly stated in
the question. Except for the appreciable reduction in the sample size and resulting loss
of precision, the results for those interviewed outside August in wave 4 and July–
September in wave 5, demonstrate no statistically significant changes compared with
the whole population sample. In most cases the size of the change is also
economically trivial, with the exception that in the wave 4–5 linear FE specification
the £30 payment reduces labour supply by around 30 min per week less.
4.4.3 Gender differences
Distinct coefficients by gender could result from a greater responsiveness of labour
supply to unearned income among female teenagers than males, but could also be due
one of the following explanations. Firstly, a larger proportion of males than females
may be induced by EMA to participate in post-compulsory education (Dearden et al.
2009, p. 830), so other things equal, this selection bias will be stronger among males
than females. Secondly, the partial correlation of EMA take-up with unobservable
characteristics determining labour supply may be stronger for one gender than the other.
Thirdly may it be the case that parents let daughters ‘keep’ a different proportion of
unearned EMA income than their sons. Nevertheless, the third and fourth sections of
Table 6 show no appreciable differences in the labour supply effect of the highest EMA
payment, with the exception of the linear fixed effect estimates. The coefficient is
considerably more negative for girls in waves 3–4 (equivalent to 41 min greater
reduction, and marginally significant), with the positions reversed at waves 4–5, though
such is the imprecision of these later estimates that the gap is no longer significant.
4.4.4 Sensitivity to covariate vector
We acknowledge the potential for the correlation between EMA receipt and several
of the dummy variable covariate sets used in estimation to induce a problem of
multicollinearity, inflating the variance of the estimates for the effect of EMA on
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labour supply. Table 7 shows results obtained when, in turn, parent’s socio-
economic classification, parent’s educational qualifications, and local area depri-
vation, are omitted from the vector of covariates.
There are no statistically or economically significant changes in the conclusions
drawn from these specifications, compared with the complete covariate set. However,
very tentatively, it can be seen that across the specifications, the direction of the bias is
negative when the dummies for ‘higher’ deprivation than the omitted category are
excluded (these being positively correlated with EMA and negatively determining
labour market opportunities), and is positive when dummies for ‘higher’ socio-economic
status and parental qualifications are omitted (these being negatively correlated with
EMA and, we would expect, positively determining the child’s employability).
Therefore, it is likely that these new results reflect changes due to the expected bias,
rather than providing evidence for collinearity having an impact on coefficients in the
main specification. As a final robustness check, we additionally show results obtained
when all three of these variables are omitted. From the final section of Table 7 it is clear
that the results again remain stable, and that the improvement in precision is minimal.
5 Discussion and conclusions
We have shown that an EMA cash transfer of £30 per week causes a statistically and
economically significant reduction in the labour supply of teenagers in full-time
education at both the intensive and extensive margin. The effects of £10 and £20
payments are smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated. This labour supply
response is one mechanism by which EMA is likely to have improved educational and
labour market outcomes for recipients, especially among those working the longest
hours. Although later waves of the LSYPE collect retrospective data on educational
performance at age 17 and 18, and allow us to observe progression into Higher
Education and the labour market, we do not evaluate the magnitude of this effect here.
There are other mechanisms by which EMA may have a direct effect on performance,
such as through raising individuals’ educational expectations and aspirations, or self-
esteem of individuals with a greater independent resource, which mean EMA is
unlikely to be a valid instrumental variable. The endogenous selection into post-
compulsory schooling induced by EMA would also represent a significant challenge to
causal inference.
Instead, the focus of this paper has been to use the labour supply effect of EMA for
inference regarding the altruistic behaviour of parents. We developed a theoretical
model in which parents specify a transfer rule contingent on the child’s labour supply,
which children take as given when choosing their utility maximising hours of work. In
this framework, EMA acts as an exogenous income shock received by the child as a
cash transfer from the state. This contrasts with most existing empirical applications
of Becker’s (1974, 1981) ‘effectively altruistic head of household’ model, which
consider the effects of in-kind transfers to children or hypothecated cash payments to
parents. Though data deficiencies prevent structural identification of this model, our
theoretical model shows the overall labour supply effect of EMA to depend on the
degree to which parents redistribute household resources in response to EMA.
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The results obtained here reject the hypotheses that parents are ‘effective altruists’
or provide ‘full insurance’ for their child’s consumption, but do suggest that for every
pound the child receives from the state, the parent withdraws between £0.22 and £0.86
from the child. Although the child’s welfare gain is greater than were the equivalent
transfer to be made to parents, particularly towards the upper bound, the results do
imply that a substantial proportion of the government’s outlay is appropriated by the
parents, rather than their children. With this in mind, if endogenous selection can
adequately be addressed, we may follow the work of Ebens et al. (2011) for the
Netherlands in identifying the extent to which grants supporting students from low-
income backgrounds participating in Higher Education crowd out parental support.
This will enable a fruitful contribution to be made in evaluating the efficiency of
‘widening participation initiatives’ being implemented alongside the recent rise in
university tuition fees in the UK. (The extent to which parents react differently to
grants substituting for loans than to grants with no substitute in the same time period,
may also provide lessons for improving the targeting of public transfers).
Our inference here relies on reasonable assumptions about the responsiveness of
in-school labour supply to unearned income or resource endowments. Data
pertaining to the cash and in-kind transfers made by parents to children receiving
EMA would be required to identify the structural parameters and make inference
regarding the magnitude of the parental response to EMA with greater robustness.
Teenagers in post-compulsory full-time education represent a unique component
of the family for whom existing theories of parental altruism or provision are clearly
insufficient. Exploration of the bargaining process undertaken by parents and
teenagers in this situation would certainly be merited. It would also be interesting to
learn whether this dynamic is affected by the current extension of compulsory
education or training to the age of 18 in the UK. Data on a second cohort of young
people in England (‘LSYPE2’ or ‘Our Futures’) is currently being collected (they
will reach post-compulsory education in 2015–2016). This will provide an excellent
resource to pursue both these questions.
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Appendix: Complete estimation output
See Table 8.
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